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NOTE
GRANTING COMITY ITS DUE: A PROPOSAL
TO REVIVE THE COMITY-BASED
APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL
ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS
The power of United States courts to control the activities of
foreign entities subject to their in personam jurisdiction has long
been recognized in the American judicial system.1 This extraterri-
1 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 624-25 (1849) (once court has juris-
diction, it has plenary authority to rule on all questions involved in case); Philp v.
Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1958) ("In a proper case, a court which has jurisdic-
tion of the parties has the power to enjoin them from proceeding with an action or
enforcing a judgment in a court of another state or country.") (citation omitted). See
RESTATEMtENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 421 (1987), which provides:
(1) A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with
respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person
or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
(2) In general, a state's exercise ofjurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to
a person or thing is reasonable if, at the time the jurisdiction is asserted:
(g) the person, whether natural or juridical, has consented to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, regularly carries on busi-
ness in the state;
(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activity in the
state, but only in respect of such activity;
(j) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the
state an activity having substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
within the state, but only in respect of such activity ....
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 53 (1971) ("A state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction to order a person, who is subject to its judicial jurisdic-
tion, to do an act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state."); see also 2 JOSEPH
STORY, CoMziENTARIEs ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1224 (1918) ("[Aluthority to con-
trol all persons and things within their own territorial limits" permits courts of equity
to restrict litigation between foreign citizens over whom they have jurisdiction.); Er-
nest J. Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel the
Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495
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torial authority has both constitutional2 and legislative' under-
pinnings. The extent of this power, however, is often called into
question when a U.S. court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with
a foreign tribunal over a matter between identical or substantially
similar parties.4 In such instances of parallel litigation, federal
district judges have the equitable power to issue injunctions
preventing such parties from proceeding with the foreign litiga-
tion.5 Although it is generally accepted that federal judges are
(1930) (recognizing power of courts of one state to enjoin proceedings in another
state); Teresa D. Baer, Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad:
Towards a Transnational Approach, 37 STAN. L. Rv. 155, 155-56 (1984).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. IH, § 2, cl. 1, which states: 'he judicial Power shall ex-
tend... to Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects."
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988) (providing that "[tihe district courts shall have
original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil ac-
tion against a foreign state . . . ."). Courts will have personal jurisdiction over all
claims against foreign states in which subject matter jurisdiction has been obtained
under subsection (a). Id. § 1330(b). In addition,
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 ... and is
between -
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state ... as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States.
Id. § 1332.
4 See Baer, supra note 1. When parallel litigation is initiated in a foreign country,
the dissatisfied party may move for an injunction against "litigation in the forum that
he finds inconvenient." Id. at 155. Traditionally, appellate courts have favored paral-
lel proceedings over a trial court's surrender ofjurisdiction. See, e.g., Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 ("Abdication of the obli-
gation to decide cases can be justified under [the doctrine of abstention]... only in...
exceptional circumstances .... .") (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)), reh'g denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); Alabama Public Serv.
Comm'n v. Southern R.R. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result) (noting that equity never counseled that federal court should dismiss suit be-
cause state court had jurisdiction). For more on the courts' duty to adjudicate the
claims brought before them, see generally New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of
the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1989) (holding that federal courts lack
authority to abstain from jurisdiction conferred upon them); Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 813-16 (stating that courts' abstention from exercise of federal jurisdiction is excep-
tion, not rule); Laker, 731 F.2d at 927 ("Courts have a duty to protect their legiti-
mately conferred jurisdiction to the extent necessary to provide full justice to
litigants.").
5 See Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852,
855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982); In re Unterweser Reederei,
GMBH., 428 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on reh'gper curiam, 446 F.2d 907 (5th
[Vol. 68:961
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empowered to grant an "antisuit injunction"6 based on the exist-
ence of certain conditions, courts are split regarding the criteria
that must be satisfied in order to justify the injunction.7 Some
jurisdictions will affirm the injunction only under a narrow set of
circumstances,8 while others are more permissive and will uphold
the injunction if only one of various criteria is met.9
Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds sub nom. MWS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (1972); In re Bloomfield S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728, 732 (2d Cir. 1970); GARY B.
BORN & DAvW WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
321 (2d ed. 1992); see also Philp, 261 F.2d at 947 (recognizing power to enjoin foreign
proceedings); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 32 (1972)
(noting duty to refuse to enforce foreign laws that are "repugnant to" domestic policy).
Injunctions against state court proceedings are beyond the scope of this Note. For
a discussion of these injunctions see 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 4221-4226 (2d ed. 1988). Federal courts are precluded from en-
joining state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or
where necessary in aid of [their] jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate [their] judg-
ments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
6 See Richard W. Raushenbush, Note, Antisuit Injunctions and International
Comity, 71 VA. L. REv. 1039, 1040 n.6 (1985) ("An 'antisuit injunction' is a court order
prohibiting or conditioning the maintenance of a suit in another court. The order is
addressed to aparty within the personal jurisdiction of the issuing court.... "). Often
a defendant in a pending action seeks declaratory relief on the same matter in some
other forum. Id. at 1041. One of the parties, and sometimes both, will move to enjoin
the other suit. Id.
See generally 1 JAI.s L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF INJUNCTIONS § 106, at
116-20 (4th ed. 1905) (discussing American rule for enjoining parties within court's
jurisdiction); infra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
7 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (6th Cir. 1992)
(recognizing that Fifth and Ninth Circuits follow 'laxer" standard, while Second and
District of Columbia Circuits have adopted more stringent view); Lawrence W. New-
man & Michael Burrows, Antisuit Injunctions and the Race to Judgment, N.Y. L.J.,
June 17, 1993, at 3 (same).
8 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
927 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (ruling that antisuit injunction is warranted only under most
"compelling of circumstances," namely, to protect enjoining court's jurisdiction and "to
prevent the litigant's evasion of the important public policies of the forum"); China
Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that
factors of protection of forum's jurisdiction and enforcement of forum's public policy
are essential to granting antisuit injunction); see also Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919, 921-23 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (favoring stricter stan-
dard), aff'd, 3 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1993).
9 See, e.g., Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 890 (Fifth Circuit listing four instances in
which granting injunction would be appropriate); Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 855
(Ninth Circuit adopting criteria used in Unterweser, concluding that injunction would
forestall "inequitable hardship" resulting from parallel proceeding in distant foreign
forum) (quoting Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 896); see also Philips Medical Sys. Intl, B.V.
v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993) (favoring laxer standard); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1961) (same).
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently ad-
dressed the competing interests that fostered this split in Allen-
dale Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc.1 Allendale
involved a European computer manufacturer, Groupe Bull, which
was owned by a French corporation, Compagnie des Machines
Bull ("CMB"), which in turn was largely owned by the French gov-
ernment.1 While contemplating a takeover of another computer
company, Bull Data Systems ("BDS"), CMB's American subsidi-
ary, purchased a worldwide property insurance policy from an
American insurer, Allendale Mutual Insurance Company ("Allen-
dale Mutual").12 When Groupe Bull centralized its European com-
puter inventory in a French warehouse, BDS added the ware-
house to the Allendale Mutual policy and later took out a French
policy with Allendale Mutual's British subsidiary, Factory Mutual
International ("FMI") to cover the warehouse. 13 In June 1991 the
computers stored at the French warehouse were destroyed by fire
and BDS subsequently filed claims under both insurance poli-
cies.' 4 Shortly thereafter, Allendale Mutual and FMI commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois seeking a declaration that the fire had been caused
by arson on the part of the insured and, therefore, was not covered
by the policies.' 5 BDS then filed two suits seeking to recover on
its insurance policies-one against Allendale Mutual in the
Northern District of Illinois,' 6 and a second against FMI in the
Commercial Court of Lille, France.
10 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
11 Id. at 426.
12 Id. BDS obtained the policy through an American broker, and negotiated and
signed the contract in the United States. Id.
13 Id. at 426-27.
14 Id.
15 Allendale, 10 F.3d at 426-27. Alternatively, the insurers sought a declaration
that their liability was limited. Id.
16 Id. The American suits were then consolidated, and BDS filed a counterclaim
in the district court. Id. at 427.
17 Id. The insurers had urged the French authorities to conduct a criminal inves-
tigation of the fire. Id. At the insurers' request, despite objection by BDS, the French
court stayed BDS's action while the investigation was pending. Id. The parties to the
district court action commenced discovery, and in February 1993 BDS moved in the
French court to have the stay lifted and the French action tried. Id. Allendale Mutual
then obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court precluding litigation of the
French action until the American suit reached a judgment. Id.
[Vol. 68:961
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Both the Illinois district court and the Commercial Court of
Lille claimed jurisdiction over the matter,'" yet the district court
granted an injunction precluding BDS from suing on its insurance
policy in France. 9 BDS maintained that the ruling constituted a
breach of international comity,20 to which the court responded,
"[t]he only concern with international comity is a purely theoreti-
18 Id. at 427. Federal jurisdiction was upheld because the litigation was between
United States citizens of completely diverse citizenship, with foreign citizens as addi-
tional parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3). Supporting the assertion of such jurisdic-
tion in Illinois was the fact that "the principal insurance policy [between plaintiff in-
surer and defendant insured] was written in the United States following negotiations
among a U.S. insurer, a U.S. broker, and a U.S. insured (BDS)." Allendale, 10 F.3d at
430. Furthermore, BDS's headquarters were in Chicago and negotiations were han-
dled in Allendale's Chicago office. Id. at 432.
Claim of jurisdiction in the Commercial Court of Lille was based on a French
statute which purported to confer upon French courts exclusive jurisdiction over
claims to "enforce insurance policies governed by the French insurance code .... " Id.
at 427. Judge Posner remarked that it had yet to be determined whether French law
in fact conferred such exclusive jurisdiction, id. at 427, 432, and he questioned
whether such a rule would preclude an American court from hearing a case of this
nature in which American interests were implicated. See id. at 432.
19 Allendale, 10 F.3d at 433. The court reasoned that if Allendale Mutual suc-
ceeded on its claim in the federal district court, the French court might not give res
judicata effect to the judgment. Id. Moreover, if the district court denied the injunc-
tion, and if the French court ruled against the plaintiff, Allendale would be deprived
of its day in court in the proper United States forum, namely, the Northern District of
Illinois. See id. at 432.
20 Id. at 431. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining comity).
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation.., nor
of mere courtesy and good will .... But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conven-
ience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64; Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987) ("Comity refers
to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of
cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states."); see also Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). The Third Circuit stated that comity
is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency.
Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not
achieve the force of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's ex-
pression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by its own
laws.
Id.; see Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st
Cir. 1969). In vacating an antisuit injunction, the First Circuit stated:
The issue is not one of jurisdiction, but one, almost as important when a
foreign sovereign is involved, of comity. The presence of the parties confers
on the district court jurisdiction to act, but the direct effect of the district
1994]
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cal one that ought not trump a concrete and persuasive demon-
stration of harm to the applicant for the injunction, if it is denied,
not offset by any harm to the opponent if it is granted."2 The
court ultimately concluded that the possibility that BDS would
defy a U.S. judgment against it and proceed with its litigation in
the Commercial Court of Lille22 was sufficient grounds to enjoin
the French action altogether.2"
Chief Judge Posner's analysis of the competing standards for
granting antisuit injunctions provides insight into how future mo-
tions for such injunctions should be analyzed and resolved. This
Note will address the discrepancies in the rationales of the federal
courts that precipitated the split in authority, and will offer a solu-
tion to the problem. Part One analyzes the merits of both the "le-
nient" and "stricter" standards which district courts apply when
ruling on motions for antisuit injunctions. Part Two discusses the
Allendale decision, taking a critical view of Judge Posner's ap-
proach to the problem, as well as his contemplation of the role of
international comity in adjudicating such cases. Part Three sug-
gests that federal courts should adopt a guideline for resolution of
these motions based loosely on that set forth in the Foreign Sover-
eign Imiaunities Act, devoting particular attention to the need for
consistency and adherence to custom when dealing with foreign
court's action on the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign requires that such
action be taken only with care and great restraint.
Id. at 578 (citations omitted).
For a glimpse of the doctrine of comity among nations that predates Hilton as
well as U.S. common law, see Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369, 370 n.* (1797).
"By the courtefy [sic] of nations, whatever laws are carried into execution, within the
limits of any government, are confidered [sic] as having the fame [sic] effect every
where [sic] fo far [sic], as they do not occafion [sic] a prejudice to the rights of the other
governments, or their citizens." Id. (quoting Ulrich Huberus, 2 Vol. B.I. Tit. 3ps 26).
Although unable to pinpoint the meaning or exact obligations of the fluid term
"comity," courts are eloquent in expressing their support for the concept. See, e.g.,
Hayes Indus., Inc. v. Caribbean Sales Assoc., Inc., 387 F.2d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1968)
("[C]omity is to be preferred to combat."); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956
F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[E]conomic interdependence requires cooperation
and comity between nations.").
21 Allendale, 10 F.3d at 432-33. This conclusion is supported by the district
court's self-proclaimed duty of "protecting its citizens ... from trumped-up multi-
million dollar claims." Id. at 432.
22 See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, The French Exequatur Proceeding: The
Exorbitant Jurisdictional Rules of Articles 14 and 15 (Code Civil) as Obstacles to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in France, 2 HAsTwGS I'L & Com. L. REv. 307
(1979) (analyzing difficulty of securing res judicata for United States judgments in
French courts).
23 Allendale, 10 F.3d at 433 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 68:961
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sovereigns and their instrumentalities. In its Conclusion, this
Note submits that the Seventh Circuit failed to accord due defer-
ence to principles of international comity and proffers that, had
the court so deferred, it would have supported the trend of the
circuits and applied the stricter standard.
I. OVERVIEW OF CONFLICTING AuTHOmrY
A. The Lenient Standard
The liberal interpretation of a court's power to enjoin foreign
proceedings is best articulated in the landmark case of In re Un-
terweser Reederei, GmbH.24 Unterweser listed four situations in
which granting an antisuit injunction would be appropriate:
"where the foreign litigation would: (1) frustrate a policy of the
forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3)
threaten the issuing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or
(4) where the proceedings prejudice other equitable considera-
tions."25 In Unterweser, plaintiff-appellee Zapata moved for an in-
junction restraining defendant-appellant Unterweser from pursu-
ing its claim on a towing contract in the High Court of Justice in
London.26 The Fifth Circuit relied on the now arcane "first-filed
rule,"27 which enables "the court first securing jurisdiction" to "en-
24 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehg per curiam, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.
1971), vacated on other grounds sub nom. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 404
U.S. 1 (1972).
25 Id. at 890 (citing 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.19 (2d ed. 1953)). One
court recited an additional factor, namely, "adjudication of the same issue in separate
actions would result in delay, inconvenience, expense, inconsistency, or race to judg-
ment." American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ir., 603 F. Supp. 636, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted); see Louise E. Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the
Apple: A Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26
IN'L L. 21, 36-37 (1992) (recognizing American Home court's use of fifth factor);
Raushenbush, supra note 6, at 1050 n.63 (same). The Southern District of New York
first mentioned the fifth factor in its understanding of Unterweser. Recent cases, how-
ever, follow only the four original factors. See, e.g., Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992).
26 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 890.
27 Id. at 981; see Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 535 (1824), (holding,
quite simply, that "[i]n all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court which first has
possession of the subject must decide it."); Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d
925, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1941) (citing McIver with approval), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813
(1942); Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 86 F. 984, 999 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1898) (holding that
first court to hear case will dispose of controversy); see also Baer, supra note 1, at 158
(noting European Economic Community's adherence to first-filed rule for purposes of
"developing close political and economic bonds among Member States"). But see Baer,
1994] 967
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join[ ] the parties ... from proceeding in another jurisdiction."2"
It then granted Zapata's motion to proscribe the foreign litigation
on the theory that concurrent suits in distant fora would impede
the "speedy and efficient determination of the cause."29 The
court's holding was buttressed by the fact that the litigation
abroad would materially affect the domestic litigants' substantive
rights. 30
More than a decade later, the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily
on Unterweser, upheld a Washington district court's injunction
prohibiting litigation of a contract claim in Canada in Seattle
Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League." In grant-
ing the injunction, the lower court weighed such factors as the
"convenience to the parties and witnesses," "the efficient adminis-
tration of justice," and the "potential prejudice" to the parties. 2
In affirming, the Ninth Circuit expressed concern that resolving
the same issues in separate trials could result in a potential race
to judgment or inconsistent rulings.3 3 Based on the broad stan-
supra note 1, at 158 n.8 (noting American courts have rejected first-filed rule); Teitz,
supra note 25, at 43 (stating first-filed rule encourages forum-shopping).
28 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 891 (quoting The Salvore, 36 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir.
1929)); see also STORY, supra note 1, § 1224, at 578.
29 Unterweser, 428 F.2d at 896 (citing In re Bloomfield S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728 (2d
Cir. 1970)).
30 See id. at 895 ("The district court was entitled to consider that remanding
Zapata to a foreign forum, with no practical contact with the controversy, could raise
a bar to recovery by a United States citizen which its own convenient courts would not
countenance.").
31 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982).
32 Id. at 856. The Ninth Circuit understood that although Congress has limited
the power of federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings, federal courts retain the
authority to enjoin foreign proceedings. Id. at 855 n.5.
33 Id. at 856.
Other courts have devised their own inquiries in order to determine whether in-
terference with a foreign litigation is warranted. See, e.g., Canadian Filters
(Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969) (stating injunc-
tion warranted when necessary for court to enforce "its own substantial interests" or
when foreign action would be duplicative); Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 531 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Minn. 1982) (noting interference proper when parties
are same and first action will dispose of suit to be enjoined).
Interestingly, in Gau Shan, the lower court tackled the problem by focusing on
the interrelationship between the two standards, and found that, due to the duplicity
of the parallel proceedings, important public policies of federal courts were
threatened. See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir.
1992).
Moreover, other courts have dismissed suits involving foreign countries in the
"interest of comity" by questioning which country has a more substantial interest in
the subject matter. See Antitrust Suit Violates Comity, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 28.
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dards articulated in Unterweser and its progeny, the Ninth Circuit
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing the injunction. 4
What emerges from Unterweser and Seattle Totems is a stan-
dard that is not difficult to satisfy.35 In order to achieve this stan-
dard and uphold an injunction, appellate courts need only con-
clude that the foreign litigation involves the same parties and
issues as the domestic suit, a situation which will often result in
potential prejudice to a party.36
B. The Stricter Standard
Some courts place a greater evidentiary burden on litigants
who seek to enjoin parallel foreign proceedings than do the lenient
jurisdictions. These courts will issue an antisuit injunction only
upon proof that failure to do so would either deprive the domestic
court of jurisdiction or result in a breach of the domestic forum's
public policy. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Air-
lines37 highlights the relevant policies underlying this stricter
standard.
Plaintiff Laker Airways ("Laker"), an American corporation,
filed an antitrust suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia against both foreign and domestic defendants
to recover for injuries sustained as a result of alleged predatory
pricing.38 Two months later, the four foreign defendants initiated
a suit in the British High Court of Justice3 9 to enjoin Laker from
seeking damages for an alleged violation of U.S. antitrust laws.4 9
34 See Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 856.
35 See Newman & Burrows, supra note 7, at 3; see also Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at
1353 ("[A] duplication of the parties and issues, alone, is sufficient to justify a foreign
antisuit injunction."). This more liberal standard has strong roots in the courts'
power to prevent evasion of the forum's laws. See Raushenbush, supra note 6, at 1049
n.60 (citing Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 111 (1890), and Baltimore & OIL R.R.
Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1941)). The liberal approach has been criticized for
demonstrating too great a concern for the issuing court and the litigants before it, at
the expense of the foreign court and of the other parties. See, e.g., Raushenbush,
supra note 6, at 1051.
36 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1353.
37 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38 Id. at 917.
39 See British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 3 All E.R. 375 (Q.B. 1983).
40 Laker, 731 F.2d at 918. The foreign action "specifically sought to compel Laker
to dismiss its suit against the foreign defendants... and to prohibit Laker from insti-
tuting any other proceedings in any non-English forum .... " Id. In the Queen's
Bench Division, Judge Parker refused to issue the injunction, concluding that al-
19941
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After the English appellate court granted the injunction, 1 the
U.S. district court barred defendants KLM and Sabena from join-
ing the British action and from taking steps in a foreign court that
could obstruct its own jurisdiction.42
In reviewing the "propriety" of the district court's injunction,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was per-
suaded only by the injunction's ability to protect the district
court's jurisdiction and to ensure the litigants' observance of the
forum's important public policies.48 The court felt compelled to
uphold the injunction because it was purely defensive in nature4
and designed for the sole purpose of preserving the forum's juris-
diction.45 Judge Wilkey's opinion has since become the bench-
mark for numerous courts and scholars that endorse the stricter
standard.
lowing Laker to proceed in the U.S. court with its antitrust suit against the British
and other foreign defendants would not violate British national sovereignty. British
Airways Board, 3 All E.R. at 395. Quoting counsel for the British Attorney General,
the court noted: "Her Majesty's Government has consistently taken the position that
British enterprises engaged in transnational business should comply with the laws
and governmental policies of the countries in which they conduct business." Id. at
392.
41 On appeal, Judge Parker's decision was reversed, and the injunction was
granted, based on the determination that discovery in the American action would be
unduly burdensome to the foreign defendants. 3 All E.R. at 409-10. This injunction
"restrain[ed] Laker from taking any steps against British Airways ... in the United
States action, and... directfed] Laker to use its best efforts to have British Airways
... dismissed from the United States action." Laker, 731 F.2d at 920.
42 Laker, 731 F.2d at 921.
43 Id. at 927. The Laker court did not treat Unterweser as persuasive authority.
Id. In two sentences the court eloquently set forth its view of the proper judicial ap-
proach to antisuit injunctions: "There are no precise rules governing [their] appropri-
ateness .... The equitable circumstances surrounding each request for an injunction
must be carefully examined to determine whether... the injunction is required to
prevent an irreparable miscarriage ofjustice." Id. (emphasis added). The court simi-
larly disposed of Seattle Totems, resolving that the concerns of avoiding hardship to
litigants and fostering judicial economy are more properly addressed by a motion to
dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens. See id. at 928.
44 Id. at 938. In contrast, the British court's injunction was "purely offensive" and
aimed at preventing the U.S. court from levying a judgment on parties clearly subject
to its jurisdiction. Id.
A court may issue three types of injunctions: defensive, offensive, and counter-
injunctive. Raushenbush, supra note 6, at 1043. Defensive injunctions are narrowly
drawn, and serve to prevent interdictory proceedings. Id. They "allow parallel ac-
tions to proceed but restrain a party from seeking relief abroad that would interfere
with the issuing court's ability to try the case before it." Id. Offensive injunctions are
broadly drawn and prevent parallel actions abroad. Id.
45 Laker, 731 F.2d at 956.
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In China Trade & Development Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 46
the Second Circuit followed the Laker rationale, yet arrived at a
different conclusion.47 Employing the lenient standard, which
had been adopted by some judges in the Southern District of New
York, the lower court maintained that equity counselled in favor
of the injunction, in that the parties and claims were identical and
met one of the Unterweser factors.48 On appeal, it was held that
the mere duplication of litigants and their claims, followed by sat-
isfaction of one or more of the Unterweser factors, was insufficient
to warrant enjoining the plaintiff from pursuing the foreign ac-
tion.49 The circuit court reasoned that "the need for due regard to
principles of international comity" must be considered where an
antisuit injunction operates to "restrict[ ] the jurisdiction of the
court of a foreign sovereign."50 As a result, notions of comity inter-
vened and were deemed more weighty than the "equitable factors"
stressed by the district court."- Thus, Laker's stricter standard
prevailed.
II. ANALYSIS OF ALLENDALE AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
ComrrY
In Allendale, Judge Posner showed concern for the inconven-
ience that would result to Allendale Mutual from concurrent liti-
gations in the United States and France.52 He also questioned
whether the Commercial Court of Lille, which is actually a panel
46 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
47 Id. at 37. The court concluded that the foreign litigation "pose[d] no threat to
the jurisdiction of the district court or to any important public policy of th[e] forum,"
and therefore denied the injunction. Id.
48 Id. at 35. The court used the rationale developed in American Home Assurance
Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ir., 603 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In American Home,
the court had adopted two questions for considering a motion to stop foreign proceed-
ings: first, whether the parties were the same, and second, whether resolution of the
first action would dispose of the action sought to be enjoined. 603 F. Supp. at 643
(citing Gorpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Since
both of these questions were answered in the affirmative, the Unterweser test was
then applied. Id.; see In re Underweser Reederei, GmbH., 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir.
1970), aff'd on rehg per curiam, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
49 China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36. An injunction supported by these factors alone
"would tend to undermine the policy that allows parallel proceedings to continue and
disfavors anti-suit injunctions." Id.
50 Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
51 Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985)).
52 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430-31, 433 (7th
Cir. 1993). The court felt that Allendale Mutual would suffer irreparable harm from
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of businessmen serving as arbitrators,5 3 possessed the adminis-
trative capability to adjudicate Allendale's arson defense to BDS's
countersuit on its insurance policy.54 However, the court did not
justify the injunction merely on the grounds of inconvenience to
Allendale and the institutional shortcomings of the French
court.55 The implications of comity were then considered.5 6
A. Posner's Approach to International Comity
The core of Allendale's approach to international comity is
based on its interpretation of the conflicting standards.57
Although Judge Posner maintained that comity was a relevant
component of the court's analysis, the court in effect upheld the
injunction because "every practical consideration support[ed]" it, 58
and because it saw no evidence that foreign relations were likely
to be impaired. 59 Judge Posner drew this same conclusion one
week prior to Allendale in Philips Medical Systems International
B.V. v. Bruetman,60 expressing doubt that an injunction would
"jeopardize amicable relations between" the United States and Ar-
BDS's strategy of suing Allendale Mutual in Chicago and suing its subsidiary in
France. Id. at 433.
53 Id. at 429.
54 Id. at 429-30. The members of the Commercial Court have no "masters, magis-
trates, law clerks, externs, or other staff that might enable them to assimilate the
voluminous materials that have been collected in the district court." Id. at 429. Pre-
trial discovery had "generat[ed] hundreds of depositions and hundreds of thousands of
documents" in the insured's attempt to reveal arson. Id. at 427. It would be virtually
impossible for Allendale Mutual to assert its arson defense through this "massive doc-
ument action" in a tribunal that lacks the resources to manage such a task. Id. at
429.
55 See id. at 431. The court was also cognizant of the insured's apparent intent to
deprive the district court ofjurisdiction, and the desire to avoid any evidence of arson
obtained through discovery by resuming its French suit. Id. at 429. Judge Posner
also recognized the duty of federal courts to adjudicate matters over which they have
jurisdiction. Id. at 430.
56 Id. at 431-33.
57 See Allendale, 10 F.3d at 431-33. Judge Posner observed that "the strict cases
presume a threat to international comity" whereas the lenient cases "demand evi-
dence.., that comity is likely to be impaired...." Id. at 431.
58 Id.
59 Id. The court suggested that an amicus curiae representation by the State De-
partment would be helpful in assessing the reality of such a threat. Id. at 431. Ab-
sent some type of showing that the injunction would "ruffle the smooth surface of our
relations with France," any claim that the injunction violates comity is "purely theo-
retical." Id. at 432-33.
60 8 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1993).
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gentina.6 ' The Philips court opined that even international cases
should not be immune from a court's ability to reduce duplicative
litigation.62 Reading these cases together, it appears that the Sev-
enth Circuit's deference to international comity, perhaps even its
judgment as to whether comity should be a factor in precluding
concurrent litigations abroad, hinges on an affirmative showing
that foreign relations will somehow be adversely affected.63
Such a ruling gives short shrift to the authority that estab-
lished comity as a guiding principle of American jurisprudence.64
Although the injunction's asserted purpose is to restrain the activ-
61 Id. at 605. As in Allendale, the court stressed the absence of any input from
the State Department or from the foreign government. Id. Although the court in-
clined toward the lenient standard, it made no definitive choice. Id. In fact, the court
went so far as to suggest that perhaps the "differences between the standards are [no]
more than verbal" and questioned "whether they even dictate different outcomes." Id.
The court held that the injunction passed both the lenient and stricter standards. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.; Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431-32 (7th Cir.
1993).
64 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895); Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Laker, Judge
Wilkey observed that:
[Comity serves our international system like the mortar which cements to-
gether a brick house. No one would willingly permit the mortar to crumble
or be chipped away for fear of compromising the entire structure.... [Tihe
central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign
tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters
international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting
predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.
Id.
United States courts "have always expounded and executed" the laws of foreign
nations as they are interpreted in the place of origin. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839). In so doing, courts administer the "comity of na-
tion[s]." Id. (citing JOSEPH STORY, CoNFLIcT OF LAws § 38 (1834)). Justice Story re-
marked that "courts of justice presume the tacit adoption" of foreign laws, "unless
they are repugnant to [their] policy or prejudicial to [their] interests." STORY, supra,
§ 38, at 37; see Baer, supra note 1, at 164-65 (stating that American courts' recogni-
tion of foreign judgments has much to do with importance of international comity); see
also Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849) (arguing that simply because
injunctions are issued against parties to litigation and not against foreign courts does
not undermine need for deference to comity).
Proponents of the laxer standard focus on pragmatism and equity, while those
favoring the stricter test maintain that international comity should be an overriding
concern. See Teitz, supra note 25, at 38. In fact, this "basic clash in underlying phi-
losophies structure[s] both the test selected and the factors chosen for emphasis." Id.;
see also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir.
1979) (noting that in cases involving foreign nations "it is unwise to ignore the fact
that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations ofjudicial power are [relevant]
considerations").
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ity of a litigant abroad, it essentially acts to curtail the jurisdiction
of a foreign tribunal by withdrawing a case from its review.65
Moreover, if foreign courts granted similar injunctions, and do-
mestic courts enforced them, it is conceivable that no party would
be able to obtain a remedy.66 In order to diminish the likelihood of
both foreign and domestic courts granting antisuit injunctions,
thereby "seiz[ing] exclusive jurisdiction" for themselves, some
writers propose that the injunctions be ignored altogether.67
B. Sixth Circuit's View of Comity
In Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,68 the Sixth Circuit was
particularly sensitive to the effect that U.S. litigations might have
65 See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985) (antisuit injunc-
tions "effectively restrict[ ] the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal"); Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981)
("[Tihere is no difference between addressing an injunction to the parties and ad-
dressing it to the foreign court itself."), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Laker, 731
F.2d at 927; Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578
(1st Cir. 1969) (recognizing effect of injunction on foreign court's jurisdiction); see also
Medtronics, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 518 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D. Minn.) (noting
that injunctive relief will indirectly affect powers of foreign courts), affd, 664 F.2d 660
(8th Cir. 1981); 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2942, at 377-78 (1973) (same).
66 See Laker, 731 F.2d at 927; Baer, supra note 1, at 165 ("[F]oreign courts might
retaliate by enjoining parties from participating in parallel American actions ....").
If foreign and domestic courts grant injunctions halting the other's pending suit, "both
actions will be paralyzed and neither party will be able to obtain any relief." Gau
Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992).
Equating comity with the "golden rule," the Third Circuit made the following ob-
servation in a case in which the defendant sought to enjoin the Philippine government
from prescribing and administering its laws within its territorial borders:
[Olne could imagine the profound legal.., issues that would arise if the
Executive Branch of the United States government were enjoined by a for-
eign court the way the district court has enjoined the Republic here. Were
the shoe on the other foot, we would surely find it intolerable for a court in
the Philippines to order the President of the United States to provide immu-
nity for witnesses who had testified in a Philippines proceeding, silence
members of Congress who called for an investigation of those witnesses, pre-
vent members of Congress from even speaking in a manner that could be
interpreted as harassment of those witnesses, or fire an independent prose-
cutor who had threatened or initiated proceedings against such witnesses.
Republic of the Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 78 n.15 (3d Cir. 1995).
67 See, e.g., Raushenbush, supra note 6, at 1066-67. The author believes domestic
courts should never recognize foreign antisuit injunctions, since they "eliminate the
concurrent jurisdiction of the domestic forum and frustrate the public policies that
authorize a cause of action in the domestic courts." Id. (emphasis added).
68 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
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on international relations, especially in the context of a global
economy.69 In Gau Shan, plaintiff Gau Shan Company moved for
a temporary restraining order in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee preventing Bankers Trust
from suing on a promissory note in Hong Kong.70 The district
court granted the injunction in part because a Bankers Trust em-
ployee had falsely testified at the injunction hearing, creating a
"strong likelihood" that Gau Shan could succeed on the merits of
the action.7 ' In remanding the case with an order to dissolve the
injunction, the court of appeals held that comity will tolerate the
banning of a foreign litigation "only in the most compelling cir-
cumstances ... ."72 The court observed that due to a growing in-
ternational market, and the heightened frequency of transactions
between citizens of different countries, the possibility of concur-
rent jurisdiction between foreign and domestic courts is far
greater today than in previous years.73 The potentially detrimen-
tal effect that an inappropriate or capricious use of antisuit in-
junctions could have on international transactions urges a more
conservative approach to their application. 74
69 Id. at 1354. The Gau Shan court rejected the United States' role as "big
brother" in the international business arena. Id. It asserted that the United States
can no longer "impose its economic will on the rest of the world and expect meek
compliance, if indeed it ever could." Id.; see also id. at 1359-60 (Jones, J., concurring)
(emphasizing offensiveness of national arrogance in today's economic climate).
70 Id. at 1352. Gau Shan supplied cotton to the People's Republic of China and
imported its cotton from Julien Company, a Tennessee corporation. Id. at 1351. On
behalf of Julien, Gau Shan had signed a promissory note to Bankers Trust enabling
Julien to receive a $20 million loan to pay one of its creditors. Id. The creditor was in
turn expected to release Julien's "certificated cotton" supply, which would be shipped
to Gau Shan for distribution in China. Id.
71 Id. at 1352.
72 Id. at 1357. It was evidently not compelling enough that Gau Shan might suf-
fer "irreparable harm" if Bankers Trust were permitted to sue in China and "exer-
cise[ I its rights under Hong Kong law to appoint a receiver for Gau Sham" See id. at
1352.
73 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1354.
74 See id. at 1354-55.
The modern era is one of world economic interdependence, and economic in-
terdependence requires cooperation and comity between nations. In an in-
creasingly international market, commercial transactions involving players
from multiple nations have become commonplace. Every one of these trans-
actions presents the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of the
nations of the parties involved .... International commerce depends in no
small part on the ability of merchants to predict the likely consequences of
their conduct in overseas markets. Predictability depends in turn on an at-
mosphere of cooperation and reciprocity between nations. The issuance of
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In light of Gau Shan's appreciation of the significance of in-
ternational comity in modern society, it is difficult to understand
the Seventh Circuit's perfunctory analysis and subsequent dismis-
sal of this doctrine, as well as its notion that a concrete demon-
stration of injury is necessary in order to ascertain the relevance
of comity.75 In Allendale, Judge Posner specifically addressed the
possibility that Allendale Mutual would not receive full and fair
consideration of its arson defense if the litigation in France were
to proceed concurrently with the U.S. action.76 If this turned out
to be the case, the court arguably could have followed the more
stringent test and arrived at the same result, thereby inflicting
less harm on international comity. For a U.S. corporate citizen to
be precluded from having a claim with substantial ties to the
United States adjudicated in an American court would be contrary
to U.S. public policy.77 It is submitted that these events would
warrant issuance of the injunction under the stricter analysis as
well. By embracing the lenient standard, the Allendale decision
reinforces the split in circuits which the Gau Shan court had tilted
in favor of the stricter test.78
antisuit injunctions threatens predictability by making cooperation and reci-
procity between courts of different nations less likely.
Id.
Many courts and commentators are troubled by the ramifications of ignoring
principles of comity. See id. at 1355; see also Teitz, supra note 25, at 36 (stating that
while injunctive relief is technically directed toward the parties, in reality it is also
offensive to foreign sovereigns). Yet courts rarely point to specific instances in which
foreign relations have been impaired by an antisuit injunction. But see George A.
Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 590 (1990) ("[International injunctive relief by American courts
has generated particularly strong protest by foreign governments .... One such set-
ting is the order to produce evidence located abroad .... [Another] is the order to
cease certain overseas practices that ... are deemed to affect adversely important
American regulatory interests.").
75 See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir.
1993).
76 Id. at 429-30. This was due to the commercial court's likely inability, or per-
haps even refusal, to entertain such a defense given the enormous document produc-
tion and the court's limited resources. Id. at 429, 433; see also supra notes 22-23 and
accompanying text.
77 See id. at 432 ("[United States] has an interest, well recognized in American
insurance law.., in providing a forum that will enable an insurer to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence.., that it is being victimized by a fraudulent claim
... ."). The fact that a judgment for Allendale Mutual in the district court might not
be given res judicata effect in the French court, thus "depriv[ing] Allendale of the
benefit of its judgment," is a valid reason for granting the injunction, even under the
stricter analysis. Id. at 433.
78 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1359 (6th Cir. 1992).
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C. Recent Development in the Third Circuit
Since the Allendale decision, another circuit has impliedly en-
dorsed the stricter test, focusing heavily on international comity
to explain its conclusion. In Republic of the Philippines v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp.,7 9 the Philippines filed a complaint
against Westinghouse and other defendants in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging, among other
things, fraud, breach of contract, bribery, and tortious interfer-
ence with fiduciary duties in connection with the construction of a
nuclear power plant in the Philippines. 0 Many of these claims
were ultimately heard by an international arbitration panel in Ge-
neva.81 After a jury verdict was rendered in favor of defendant
Westinghouse, the Philippines sought certification to appeal.
8 2
The district court indicated that certification was proper, but post-
poned granting certification upon learning of evidence that the
Philippines had harassed witnesses who testified, or would poten-
tially testify, on behalf of Westinghouse. 83 On defendant Westing-
house's motion, the district court enjoined the Philippine govern-
ment from harassing any such witnesses in retaliation for their
testimony in the U.S. action or in the arbitration.8 4
Although the injunction restricted the activities of a foreign
executive, and not its judiciary, the Third Circuit seemed to review
the order as if it were ruling on a motion to enjoin foreign proceed-
ings.8 5 As a result, it followed the rationale of the stricter circuits
79 43 F.3d 65 (3d Cir. 1995).
80 Id. at 67-68.
81 Id. at 68. Most of the Philippines' claims were referred to international arbi-
tration. Id. The claim of tortious interference with fiduciary duties was being pre-
pared for trial in the district court while the remaining counts were arbitrated in
Geneva. Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 69.
84 Republic of the Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 70-71 (3d Cir.
1995). Two Westinghouse employees and a professor of law at the University of the
Philippines had offered testimony for Westinghouse. Id- at 68. The court issued the
injunction because it learned the witnesses "had been 'the target of vilification in the
public press" and had "faced public censure and lost business opportunities" as a
result of government retaliation for their testimony. Id. at 69 (citation omitted).
85 See id. at 76-77 (analyzing propriety of injunction). The court devoted substan-
tial attention to the "inherent authority" of a federal court "to control [the conduct of]
litigants who come before it." Id. at 72-73. While the injunction was granted in part
to ensure that the U.S. litigation proceed fairly, with all the relevant evidence
presented, it essentially would have "supervise[d] and control[led] the law enforce-
ment activities of a foreign sovereign nation against its own citizens on its own soil
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and reached its decision by deferring to principles of comity. 6
The court found that the injunction against the Philippines of-
fended notions of comity.8 7 While conceding that comity does not
"prevent[ I a district court from having the power to address
wrongdoing that impacts a domestic court," it does "force courts in
the United States to tailor their remedies carefully to avoid undue
interference with the domestic activities of other sovereign na-
tions."88 The district court did have authority to sanction the Phil-
ippines for threatening witnesses through acts performed in the
Philippines. The court abused its discretion, however, by impos-
ing a sanction that intruded excessively on the activities of a for-
eign sovereign. 9
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals stated that it
was necessary to balance the interests furthered by the domestic
court's use of sanctions against the foreign sovereign's interests in
prescribing and enforcing laws with respect to its citizenry.9 0 The
injunction issued by the district court, which "purport[ed] to place
the court in the position of supervising the law enforcement activi-
ties of a foreign sovereign nation against its own citizens on its
own soil,"91 violated the Philippines' sovereignty due to the availa-
bility of less disruptive sanctions, such as monetary fines or dis-
missal.92 Because the district judge made his ruling without ade-
quately weighing these competing interests, his issuance of the
.... " Id. at 71-73. For this reason, the court of appeals held that the district judge
exceeded his discretion. Id. at 73.
86 See id. at 76. The court remarked:
Consequently, although the courts of appeals have occasionally approved or-
ders issued by district courts enjoining activities or judicial proceedings in
foreign countries that would interfere with the proper exercise of district
court jurisdiction, they have recognized that such action must be exercised
only in rare cases, and must be premised on a thorough analysis of the inter-
ests at stake.
Id. The court then referenced with approval two appellate decisions that upheld the
stricter standard. See id. at 76-77 (discussing United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025
(2d Cir. 1985), and Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
87 Id. at 75.
88 Id.
89 Westinghouse, 43 F.3d at 75.
90 Id. at 76, 77-79.
91 Id. at 78.
92 Id. at 80. Notwithstanding a sovereign's occasional "exercise [of] jurisdiction to
prescribe and enforce laws that reach extraterritorial conduct," it is axiomatic that
each nation retains "the sole jurisdiction to prescribe and administer its own laws, in
its own country, pertaining to its own citizens, in its own discretion." Id. at 79 (em-
phasis added).
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injunction was an abuse of discretion, and the court of appeals
lifted the injunction.9 3 Perhaps it would now be fitting for the
Seventh Circuit to rethink its approach to antisuit injunctions in
light of the courts' prevailing respect for international comity.
III. USING THE FOREIGN SOvEREIGN IMMuNITm S ACT
AS A GUIDE
A Background of Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Traditionally, both foreign and domestic courts followed the
doctrine of "absolute" sovereign immunity, declining to assert ju-
risdiction over foreign states in virtually all cases.9 4 Since its for-
mal inception into the American common law, the theory of sover-
eign immunity has been deemed to rest on principles of "grace and
comity."95 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197696
("FSIA') codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
adopted by the United States Department of State nearly twenty-
five years earlier.97 Congress resolved that a narrower applica-
93 Id. at 80-81.
94 See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
In Schooner Exchange, Justice Marshall noted that in order to preserve and promote
unrestricted intercourse between friendly nations, it was essential that the "perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns [be honored.] ... [E]very sovereign
is [thus] understood to wave [sic] the exercise of a part of [its] complete exclusive
territorial jurisdiction by granting immunity to foreign sovereigns for acts committed
within its borders." Id. at 137; Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting
of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, May 19, 1952, DiE'T ST. BuLL., June
1952, at 984 [hereinafter Tate Letter] (naming countries whose courts have histori-
cally granted absolute immunity).
95 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); The Stantis-
sima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822). These cases rely on Schooner Ex-
change's fundamental notion that the partial surrender of sovereign power is "traced
up to the consent of the nation itself." See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136. The
"relaxation ... of that absolute and complete jurisdiction... which sovereignty con-
fers," id., is a practice that conforms to the definition of comity set forth nearly eighty
years later in Hilton. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
96 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-
1611 (1988)).
97 See Tate Letter, supra note 94, at 984; H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604-07. In accepting the restrictive
theory of immunity, the Tate Letter circumscribed traditional notions of absolute sov-
ereign immunity which had been recognized by U.S. courts dating back to the early
nineteenth century. Tate Letter, supra note 94, at 985. Three maritime cases, de-
cided after Schooner Exchange, preceded the State Department's issuance of the Tate
Letter.
In the first case, decided over a century after Schooner Exchange, the Supreme
Court held that the principles adopted in that landmark case applied to all ships
"used by a government for a public purpose" and declined to assert jurisdiction over a
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tion of immunity "would serve the interests of justice and would
protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants in United
States courts.""8 Thereafter, foreign sovereigns could properly be
held liable in U.S. courts for certain types of commercial activi-
ties,99 as well as for tortious activities conducted within the terri-
torial United States.100 Upon a court's finding that subject matter
jurisdiction has been conferred by the FSIA,101 the foreign sover-
libel in rem action against an Italian vessel. Berrizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562, 574, 576 (1926). Expressing the prevailing view of the lower federal
courts, Justice Van Devanter found that "merchant ships owned and operated by a
foreign government" enjoy the same immunity that warships do, as recognized in
Schooner Exchange. Id. at 576. Henceforth, courts began to follow the executive
branch's initiative when adjudicating cases regarding the propriety of granting immu-
nity to foreign vessels.
In the second maritime case, Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), the State De-
partment had "certified" to the district courts its ruling of immunity to foreign vessels,
and the Supreme Court deferred to the executive branch. Id. at 589. "[T]he judicial
seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity,
and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and
follow the executive determination that the vessel is immune." Id. at 588. (emphasis
added).
In the third maritime case, Justice Stone, citing Schooner Exchange, Berrizzi
Brothers, and Ex parte Peru with approval, again held that an executive dictate of
immunity to foreign ships should be accorded deference by the judiciary. Republic of
Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Justice Stone cautioned, however, that "recogni-
tion ... of an immunity upon principles which the political [branch] . . . has not
sanctioned may" undermine the nation's ability to protect its "national interests and
[secure its] recognition by other nations." Id. at 36.
98 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (setting forth findings and declaration
of purpose of FSIA).
99 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). This statute provides, in relevant
part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case -
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the for-
eign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States ....
Id. § 1605(a)(2); Tate Letter, supra note 94, at 985.
100 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Foreign sovereigns are amenable to U.S. jurisdiction
when "money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death,
or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state .... " Id.
101 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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eign may, depending on the extent of its contacts with the forum,
be subject to in personam jurisdiction. 0 2
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, first articulated
by the executive department in the Tate Letter,10 3 and subse-
quently codified by the FSIA, continues to insulate foreign states
and their instrumentalities from jurisdiction based on sovereign
or public acts (jure imperii), but not with respect to private or com-
mercial acts (jure gestionis). °4 As mentioned before, comity is the
underlying principle that supports the United States' observance
of sovereign immunity. 05 Absent an international treaty or
agreement providing otherwise, it logically follows that a foreign
sovereign should expect comity to govern its relations with the
United States in matters involving the executive or judicial
branches of the respective countries. 06
B. FSIA as a Model for Deference to Comity
Given its critical role in matters regarding foreign sovereign
immunity, and the limited circumstances under which foreign
states will be held to answer in U.S. courts, 0 7 comity should like-
102 Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Arg., 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); see Decor by Nikkei Intl, Inc.
v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd sub nom.
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). In order to uphold jurisdiction, a reviewing
court must find "not only that there be an immediate causal effect within the United
States ... but also that there be sufficient minimum contacts between the matter in
controversy and the United States ... ." Id.
103 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (limiting immunity of foreign states for certain commer-
cial activities); Tate Letter, supra note 94, at 984; see also Victory Transp. Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir.
1964) (confining immunity to situations involving foreign state's internal administra-
tive acts, legislation, armed forces, diplomatic activities and public loans), cert. de-
nied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
105 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106 See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INL L.J. 1, 5-6
(1991) (stating that U.S. courts have avoided friction in foreign relations under "ru-
bric of comity"); see also Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th
Cir. 1992) (asserting that healthy world economy "requires... comity between na-
tions"). Comity has also formed the basis for recognition of foreign judgments and
foreign arbitral awards. See MARx JANmS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATioNAL LAW
250 (1988) (cited in Paul, supra, at 1 n.2). See generally BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 816
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "international law" as "[blody of consensual principles which
have evolved from customs and practices .... International customs and treaties are
generally considered to be the two most important sources of international law.").
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing general exceptions to
jurisdictional immunity of foreign states).
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wise compel judges to exercise restraint when ruling on motions to
enjoin foreign proceedings. 10 Because Congress has implemented
a narrow framework within which the judiciary may review acts of
a foreign state, judges should accept their limited power to inter-
fere with a foreign tribunal's ability to interpret and apply its own
laws.10 9 This may be achieved in part by a policy which grants
antisuit injunctions only when failure to do so would either de-
prive a court of its jurisdiction or flout a legitimate public policy of
the enjoining forum. 110
Both the federal government and the individual states have
acknowledged that an effective foreign policy depends upon a pat-
tern of consistency in the United States' relations with foreign
states.'1 ' In a recent address before the American Society of In-
ternational Law, Justice Blackmun stated that "[wlhere no treaty
or other legal authority is controlling, resort must be had to the
customs of nations." 12 An indiscriminate use of antisuit injunc-
tions would alert foreign governments that U.S. courts are pre-
pared to divest their tribunals of jurisdiction to adjudicate1 1 3 in
any matter where the parties or issues in a concurrent action are
108 See Baer, supra note 1, at 164-65. "Comity should be an American court's key
concern in deciding whether to enjoin parties from proceeding abroad." Id. at 164
(emphasis added). Baer offers three reasons for acknowledging comity in the injunc-
tion context: the potential for foreign states to react to an injunction by declining to
recognize U.S. judgments; the inherent reservations surrounding the extent of an
American court's extraterritorial authority; and the incompetence of domestic courts
to handle foreign affairs, resulting in embarrassment to the executive branch. See id.
at 164-67.
109 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
110 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
111 See, e.g., UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTs RECoGNIoN ACr § 3, 13 U.L.A.
135 (1962 & Supp. 1994) (providing that "final and conclusive" foreign judgments con-
cerning relief are enforceable against parties to action); Convention Abolishing the
Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents, opened for signature Oct.
5, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 10,072, 527 U.N.T.S. 189 (entered into force for United States
Oct. 15, 1981) (exempting contracting states from requirement that foreign public
documents be certified by diplomatic agents of country where documents must be pro-
duced). As of the end of 1994, the 24 states which had adopted the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act were Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
112 Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a De-
cent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSLErrER (American
Soc'y Int'l Law), Mar.-May 1994, at 6.
113 See RESTATEMENT (THmD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 421 (1986).
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identical." 4 This seems entirely inconsistent with our general
tendency to refrain from interfering with the domestic affairs of
foreign governments.1 1 5 Since judicial proceedings are public in
nature, and are exercises of sovereignty, they should be extended
comity, just as public acts of a foreign state are granted immunity
under the FSIA. Use of the stricter test when reviewing motions
to enjoin foreign proceedings will permit foreign courts to dispense
their adjudicatory power unless doing so would strip a U.S. court
of its jurisdiction or violate U.S. public policy.11 6
Considering the United States' proclivity for recognizing for-
eign judgments,1 7 the latter approach seems better suited to en-
sure the coequal status of American and foreign judicial systems.
Just as the FSIA functions to protect foreign litigants and foreign
states in U.S. courts,1 8 a restricted use of foreign antisuit injunc-
114 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992).
115 See Republic of the Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir.
1995). Principles of comity "force courts in the United States to tailor their remedies
carefully to avoid undue interference with the domestic activities of other sovereign
nations." Id.
116 See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971) (holding that legislative, executive, and judicial acts of foreign govern-
ment will be honored unless "acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the inter-
est of the nation called upon to give [them] effect"), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
117 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 481 (1986), which
states:
(1) Except as provided in § 482, a final judgment of a court of a foreign state
granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, establishing or confirm-
ing the status of a person, or determining interests in property, is conclu-
sive between the parties, and is entitled to recognition in courts in the
United States.
Id.; see also id. § 487 (recognizing foreign arbitral agreements and awards).
Scholars have justified recognition of foreign judgments by observing that an
overzealous assertion of "parochial interests" would result in injustice and disruption
of "the normal patterns of life .... " Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1601, 1603 (June 1968); see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 233 (Fuller, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe rule is universal in this country that private rights acquired under
the laws of foreign states will be respected and enforced in our courts unless contrary
to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of the state" where enforcement is sought.).
But see ANDREAS F. LowENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 371-72
(1993) (advancing five arguments against foreign judgment recognition).
For a discussion of enforcement of American judgments in a foreign country, see
Gerfried Fischer, Recognition and Enforcement of American Tort Judgments in Ger-
many, 68 ST. JomN's L. REv. 199 (1994). German courts will generally recognize U.S.
judgments if "the trial court had jurisdiction and.., due process [was] met," unless
the judgment was in clear violation of "German public policy." Id. at 208 (footnotes
omitted).
118 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988); see also supra notes 94-104 and accompanying
text.
1994] 983
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tions safeguards the integrity of judiciaries abroad by allowing
concurrent litigations to proceed until a final judgment has been
rendered.11 9 If the domestic court concludes that the decision vio-
lates public policy, or otherwise lacks sufficient basis for recogni-
tion, it may then refuse to enforce the judgment. 120
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of international comity does
little to effectuate reciprocal courtesy among courts of different
sovereigns. By holding that a non-moving party must offer evi-
dence of material injury to U.S. foreign relations as a criterion for
denying an antisuit injunction, the court essentially failed to as-
sess comity within its proper context. A reviewing court should
concede that comity is likely to be undermined in every instance in
which a party to concurrent litigations requests a district judge to
enjoin the foreign proceeding, by virtue of the fact that the injunc-
tion deprives the foreign court of jurisdiction. The proper inquiry
should then be whether certain equitable factors are so strong as
to militate in favor of the injunction, despite its negative effect on
diplomatic relations. The Gau Shan and Westinghouse courts did
precisely this by adhering to the stricter standard. Insofar as it is
narrowly tailored to protect the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and do-
mestic public policy, the stricter standard acts as a self-regulatory
doctrine. Unless the foreign litigation is patently offensive to U.S.
jurisdiction over a case, or to U.S. public policy, the injunction will
be denied and both tribunals will be free to administer their adju-
dicatory powers. Reviewing courts that exercise this discretion
119 Raushenbush, supra note 6, at 1067. The author asserts that use of the in-
junctions must be kept to a minimum so as to avoid "eroding the basis of the interna-
tional legal system." Id. at 1070; see also Bermann, supra note 74, at 605-08 (discuss-
ing judicial self-restraint in international cases). See generally Teitz, supra note 25
(proposing solution to dilemma of parallel proceedings through use of Conflict of Ju-
risdiction Model Act). The Model Act offers a flexible guideline for resolution of con-
current international litigations by enabling one forum to determine the proper forum
for all subsequent proceedings. Id. at 55. Perhaps the hallmark of the Model Act is
its "supranational perspective," which it achieves by "removing parochial national in-
terests . .. ." Id.; see id. at 56 (text of Model Act).
120 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Neither domestic nor interna-
tional law will compel a U.S. court to enforce a foreign judgment that is contrary to
U.S. public policy. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164 ("[N]o nation will suffer the laws of
another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens.").
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will protect domestic jurisdiction and advance comity between for-
eign nations.
Haig Najarian

